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Abstract
The global financial crisis in 2007–2009 demonstrated that systemic risk can spread all over the world through a complex web
of financial linkages, yet we still lack fundamental knowledge about the evolution of the financial web. In particular, interbank
credit networks shape the core of the financial system, in which a time-varying interconnected risk emerges from a massive
number of temporal transactions between banks. The current lack of understanding of the mechanics of interbank networks
makes it difficult to evaluate and control systemic risk. Here, we uncover fundamental dynamics of interbank networks by
seeking the patterns of daily transactions between individual banks. We find stable interaction patterns between banks from
which distinctive network-scale dynamics emerge. In fact, the dynamical patterns discovered at the local and network scales
share common characteristics with social communication patterns of humans. To explain the origin of “social” dynamics in
interbank networks, we provide a simple model that allows us to generate a sequence of synthetic daily networks characterized
by the observed dynamical properties. The discovery of dynamical principles at the daily resolution will enhance our ability to
assess systemic risk and could contribute to the real-time management of financial stability.
Introduction
Financial systemic risk is one of the most serious threats to
the global economy. The global financial crisis of 2007–2009
showed that a failure of one bank can lead to a financial con-
tagion through a complex web of financial linkages, which
are created by everyday transactions among financial insti-
tutions [1, 2]. Even after the crisis, many countries have
experienced a prolonged recession, the so-called Great Reces-
sion, showing that the social cost of a financial crisis can be
enormous [3, 4]. Evaluating and controlling systemic risk has
therefore been recognized as one of the greatest challenges for
interdisciplinary researchers across different fields of science [5–
8].
In the modern financial system, interbank markets play a
fundamental role, in which banks lend to and borrow from each
other (hereafter, we refer to all types of financial institutions
as “banks" for brevity). Lending and borrowing in interbank
markets are necessary daily tasks for banks to smoothen their
liquidity management [9], but at the same time, they also form
the center of a global web of interconnected risk; shocks to
interbank markets may spill over to other parts of the global
financial system through the financial linkages to which banks
are connected [6, 10, 11]. Many previous studies attempt
to assess systemic risk by simulating different scenarios of
cascading bank failures on both real [12–16] and synthetic
interbank credit networks [11, 17–22]. Studies of financial cas-
cades based on synthetic networks often assume a particular
static structure, such as random [18, 19], bipartite [11, 23],
and multiplex structures [21, 22], successfully revealing that
the structural property affects the likelihood of default cas-
cades to a large extent. However, since the great majority of
real-world interbank transactions are in fact overnight [9, 24],
interbank networks should be treated as dynamical systems
with their structure changing on a daily basis. This temporal
nature of real interbank networks inevitably limits the practi-
cal usefulness of the conventional static approach to systemic
risk. Nevertheless, we still have little knowledge about how
the structural characteristics of daily networks evolve over
time. It has long been believed that the dynamics of interbank
networks is random and thus has no meaningful regularity
at the daily scale [25]. How the current network structure is
correlated with the past structures, or more specifically, how
banks choose current trading partners based on their trading
history, is still unknown. The ambiguity of the structural dy-
namics of interbank networks itself may also become a source
of systemic risk by veiling the complexity of interconnectiv-
ity [26]. The current lack of studies on the mechanics of real
interbank networks is in stark contrast to the abundance of
research on their static property [12, 15, 27–30].
The main aim of this work is to uncover fundamental dy-
namics governing real interbank networks at both local and
system-wide scales. For this purpose, we first seek dynami-
cal regularities that would characterize interaction patterns
between individual banks by looking at millions of overnight
transactions conducted in the Italian interbank market during
2000–2015 [31]. We discover that there exist explicit interac-
tion patterns that rule daily bank-to-bank transactions, which
turn out to be essentially the same as the patterns character-
izing human social communication; that is, banks trade with
their partners in the same way that people interact with friends
through phone calls and face-to-face conversations [32, 33]. In
fact, those “social” interaction patterns of banks have been
surprisingly stable over time, even amid the global financial cri-
sis. On top of local interactions between banks, there emerges
a system-wide scaling relationship between the numbers of
banks and transactions, just as the number of phone-call pairs
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scales superlinearly with the size of population [34].
To explain the origin of social dynamics in interbank net-
works, we develop a model that generates a sequence of syn-
thetic daily networks from which all the observed dynamical
patterns simultaneously emerge at both local and network
scales. Our discovery of the fundamental mechanism under-
pinning the daily evolution of interbank networks will enhance
the predictability of systemic risk and provide an important
step toward the real-time management of financial stability.
Results
The dataset to be analyzed in this work is the time series of
daily networks identified from the time-stamped data of inter-
bank transactions conducted in the Italian interbank market
during 2000–2015 (Materials and Methods: Data). The daily
interbank networks have directed edges originating from lend-
ing banks to borrowing banks. One may regard the amount of
funds transferred from a lender to a borrower as edge weights,
but here we regard the daily networks as unweighted, since
we found that the dynamics of edge weights can be decou-
pled from the edge dynamics themselves (see Supplementary
Materials (SM) for the analysis of edge weights).
An important general observation regarding the dynamics
of daily networks is that both the network size N and number
of edges M have followed downward trends (Fig. 1 a and b).
This led the networks closer to a bipartite structure between
pure lenders and pure borrowers [35] (Fig. 1c and Table S1),
entailing a rapid turnover in the set of banks participating
in each daily network (see the turnover rate in Table 1 and
Fig. S4). Table 1 summarizes the basic statistics, in which we
divide the entire sample period into three subsample periods
to observe whether a structural change around the global
financial crisis in 2007–2009 is present.
Dynamical patterns of daily networks
The downward trends in N andM , along with the intermittent
spikes, left a broad range of daily combinations (N,M), which
allows us to ask how the number of financial linkages is dynam-
ically constrained by the number of banks. In fact, there arises
a clear superlinearity, M ∝ N1.5 (Fig. 2a). This suggests that
the average degree of a daily network increases with order√
N , or 〈k〉 ∝ √N . It should be noted that the fact that M
is given as a power-law function of N is similar to a widely
observed phenomenon in social networks, called superlinear
scaling, in which the number of edges scales superlinearly with
the number of nodes across different locations [34, 38–40].
In addition to the macroscopic dynamics of N and M , we
also find characteristic properties of the microdynamics of
Table 1. Summary statistics of the daily interbank networks
All 2000–2006 2007–2009 2010–2015
# days 3,922 1,618 767 1,537
N 94.23 129.69 98.92 54.56
M 302.76 466.35 304.89 129.48
Turnover rate 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.26
Bipartivity 0.77 0.64 0.78 0.92
N and M denote the average numbers of active banks and edges in the
daily networks, respectively. The turnover rate is the average of the
Jaccard distance 1− |It ∪ It−1|/|It ∩ It−1|, where It is the set of active
banks on day t. See caption of Fig. 1c for a description of bipartivity.
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
years
0.5
0.75
1
Bi
pa
rti
vit
y
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
years
0
50
100
150
N
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 20150
200
400
600
M
Nov 23, 2000
Oct 29, 2008
Aug 15, 2013
N = 162
N = 77
N = 13
c
a
b
Fig. 1. Time series of daily networks. (a) Daily time series of the number of edges
M (upper) and the number of banks N (lower). Most of the downward spikes in
N and M are due to the national holidays in Italy. (b) Visualization of the largest
(left), a middle-sized (middle) and the smallest (right) daily networks (visualized by
graph-tool [36]) (c) Time series of bipartivity. Bipartivity is a measure of bipartite
structure that takes 1 if the network is fully bipartite and 0.5 if a complete graph [37].
Black line represents the moving average with 20-day smoothing window.
individual edges: edge duration and interval time. We de-
fine duration τ as the number of successive business days on
each of which a bank pair performs at least one transaction.
Aggregated over all trading pairs, τ follows a power-law distri-
bution whose complementary cumulative distribution function
(CCDF) has an exponent between 2.5 and 2.9 (Fig. 2b and
Fig. S5 in SM. The exponents are estimated using the method
proposed in Refs. [41, 42]). Similar power-law distributions
are observed when we redefine τ as the duration of individual
banks’ successive trading activity either for lending, borrowing,
or both (Fig. S6 in SM).
On the other hand, the interval time ∆τ for a bank pair is
defined as the interval length between two consecutive trans-
actions during which the bank pair performs no transactions.
In contrast to τ , ∆τ does not follow a power-law distribution,
while it still shows a long-tailed behavior (Fig. 2c). The inter-
val distribution fits well with a Weibull distribution up to a
certain cut-off level (Fig. 2c, Inset. See section S1 of SM for
details on the fitting method [43, 44]).
We observe that the distributions of τ and ∆τ have been
quite stable throughout the whole data period. This obser-
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Fig. 2. Dynamical patterns of daily networks. (a) M is a power-law function of N . A
dot corresponds to a daily network, and solid line represents a log-linear regression
estimated by the ordinary least squares. (b) Distribution of consecutive trading days,
τ , fo a bank pair, aggregated over all pairs. Blue circles and red triangles indicate
the empirical distributions for 2000–2006 and 2010–2015, respectively. Solid and
dotted lines represent simulated distributions with NP = 300 and 100, respectively.
(c) Distribution of interval time, ∆τ , between two consecutive transactions for a bank
pair, aggregated over all pairs. Inset : log-rank plot of (∆τ)c indicated by a Weibull
distribution with estimated parameter c (symbols), and its theoretical values (lines).
(d) Time series of the empirical aggregate degree K(t) (averaged over all banks)
normalized by its terminal value K(T ) and (e) the simulated aggregate degree.
vation is notable, not only because N and M continually
fluctuate at a daily resolution over the course of the decreasing
trends (Fig. 1a), but also because a large fraction of the set
of participating banks changes day to day (Fig. S4). The
high metabolism of the interbank market suggests that the
stationarity of τ and ∆τ is not necessarily attributed to the
presence of steady relationships between particular banks.
While the dynamics of individual edges in daily networks
is shown to follow particular patterns, it would also be mean-
ingful to see the dynamics of aggregated edges (i.e., edges
of aggregated networks). We focus on the aggregated degree
K(t), defined by the average cumulative number of unique
trading partners up to time t [33, 45]. The normalized aggre-
gate degree, defined by K(t)/K(T ), grows sublinearly in time
(Fig. 2d), meaning that the rate at which banks find a new
partner tends to decrease over time. Note that such sublinear
growth patterns are also reported for the mobility pattern of
mobile-phone users [45] and for contact networks of human
individuals formed via face-to-face interactions [33].
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Fig. 3. Superlinear relation in the fitness model. Solid lines denote the theoretical
values indicated by Eq. (2), while symbols represent the corresponding simulation
results (average of 500 runs). Scaling relationM ∝ Nβ with 1 < β < 2 emerges by
varying NP when NP is small (approximately 20 ≤ NP ≤ 300). Inset : increasing
NP to 10000 restores quadratic scaling M ∝ N2 since q0 ≈ 0 and thereby the
finite-size effect disappears.
Model of daily network evolution
The above findings show that the dynamical patterns of inter-
bank transactions are robust across different periods, which
leads us to consider that a universal mechanism generating
daily interbank networks might exist. Here, we show that
the emergence of these regularities can be reconstructed by
a dynamical generalization of the fitness model [46, 47] (see
Materials and Methods: Model).
First, we show that variations in the system size of a simple
fitness model can explain the empirical superlinear relation
M ∝ N1.5. For ease of exposition, suppose for the moment
that the networks are undirected. In the fitness model, fitness
value ai ∈ [0, 1] is assigned to bank i (1 ≤ i ≤ NP), where
NP represents the potential market size, given by the number
of banks that may perform transactions during a day. In
the context of interbank transactions, fitness value ai can be
interpreted as the activity level, or willingness, of bank i to
trade. The probability that an edge is formed between i and j
is given by pij = (aiaj)α (α ≥ 1). For each network generated
by this rule, N and M denote the number of active banks
with at least one edge (thus N ≤ NP) and the total number
of edges, respectively.
By generating model networks with NP varying from 20
to 300 for a given α ∈ [2, 8], there arises a scaling relation
M ∝ Nβ with 1 < β < 2 (symbols in Fig. 3). In previous
studies [46–48], a theoretical analysis of the fitness model
predicted M ∝ N2, which differs from both our empirical
observations (Fig. 2a) and numerical simulations (Fig. 3). In
fact, this discrepancy is explained by the presence of isolated
banks. In this model, the probability of a bank being isolated
(i.e., no edges attached), defined by q0, is given by a function
of NP:
q0(NP) =
1
α
(α+ 1)
1
α
[
B
(
NP,
1
α
)
− B1− 1
α+1
(
NP,
1
α
)]
,
[1]
where B(x, y) and Bz(x, y) are beta and incomplete beta func-
tions, respectively (see section S2 for derivation). Conse-
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Fig. 4. Generation of model networks. (a) Model networks with NP = 100, 200,
and 300 (visualized by graph-tool [36]). The average values 〈N〉 and 〈M〉 for each
NP are also shown. (b) Joint conditional probability function f(N,M |NP) (color
bar) for a given NP.
quently, N and M are given by{
N = (1− q0(NP))NP,
M = 〈(aiaj)α〉NP(NP−1)2 .
[2]
Since q0(NP) → 0 as NP → ∞, N ' NP and M '
〈(aiaj)α〉N(N − 1)/2 ∝ N2 hold true for a sufficiently large
NP, which recovers the quadratic scaling shown in the previous
studies [46–48]. However, for the range of network sizes ob-
served from the data, q0(NP) is not negligible. A combination
of (N,M) derived from Eq. (2) for given values of NP perfectly
fits the simulation result (lines in Fig. 3) .
While the superlinear relation M ∝ N1.5 can be explained
by variations in NP, this simple model cannot reproduce the
distributions of τ and ∆τ (Fig. 2 b and c) and the sublinear
growth of K(t) (Fig. 2d) since these characteristics come from
the effect of memory in the formation of links between banks.
To capture the memory effect, we introduce a fluctuation in
fitness ai. We assume that at the beginning of day t + 1,
ai,t+1 is updated according to a random walk process or reset
to a random value between 0 and 1 with probability h(ai,t)
(see Materials and Methods: Model). The reset probability is
intended to capture the metabolism of interbank markets, in
which some banks exit the market after continuous transac-
tions, whereas other banks enter after a long resting periods
(e.g., due to a change in the strategy of liquidity management).
We find that the simulated distributions of duration τ and
interval ∆τ for pairwise transactions replicate the empirical
distributions for a given NP (see lines in Fig. 2 b and c). We
confirmed that the model can robustly reproduce the duration
and interval distributions under different parameter settings
(Figs. S7 b and c, S8 and S9). In addition, the growth pattern
of the normalized aggregate degree K(t)/K(T ) is successfully
reproduced (Fig. 2e). We also evaluate the model fit for other
dynamical properties such as the degree distribution and the
strength as a function of degree [49] (Figs. S10–S12).
It should be noted that while the activity level ai,t fluctuates
with time independently from other banks’ activity levels, the
model ensures that the size and the structure of generated
networks are stationary for a given NP. In reality, however,
the evolution of daily networks show a decreasing trend (Fig. 1
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Fig. 5. Dynamic characteristics of fitted daily networks. (a) Time series of NP,ML.
Inset : Scatter plot ofNP,ML against empiricalN andM . (b) Bipartivity of fitted daily
networks. Black line represents the moving average with 20-day smoothing window.
(c) Scatter plot ofN andM of fitted daily networks. A dot corresponds to a day. Solid
line illustrates the empirical regression line identical to that shown in Fig. 2a.
a and b) and the network size varies from day to day owing
to various external factors (e.g., shifts in monetary policy [35]
and the seasonality of money demand due to the national
holidays and/or the reserve requirement system [9]). In the
model, the averages of the network size 〈N〉 and the number
of edges 〈M〉 are controlled by tuning parameter NP (Fig. 4a).
Fitting model to the data
In practice, the influence of exogenous factors that would af-
fect the network size might vary daily. Since in the model
the average network size is controlled by tuning parameter
NP, we need to estimate the daily sequence of NP to recon-
struct time series of empirical daily networks. Here, we take
the following steps. First, we generate sufficiently many in-
stances of synthetic networks for a given NP to compute the
histogram of (N,M) (Fig. 4b). Generating networks over a
sufficiently broad range of NP provides a conditional proba-
bility function f(N,M |NP) that would cover the range of N
and M observed in the empirical networks (Fig. S13). Sec-
ond, for a given empirical daily network with (N ′,M ′), we
choose a daily estimate of NP, denoted by NP,ML, such that
NP,ML = argmaxNPf(N
′,M ′|NP).
We find that simulated instances of (N,M) concentrate
tightly along the regression line of M ∝ N1.5 when we vary
NP from 50 to 350 (Fig. S13). This agreement holds true
even under alternative parameter values within a reasonable
range of variation (Figs. S7a and S14). The sequence of daily
estimates of NP,ML, each of which is based on the empirical
combination (N ′,M ′) of a day, exhibit a long-term downward
trend consistent with the empirical sequence of N and M
4
(Fig. 5a). Specifically, NP,ML is proportional to N and in-
creases nonlinearly in M with saturation at NP,ML ≈ 300
(Fig. 5a, Inset).
A time series of model networks based on the daily esti-
mates of NP,ML reproduces the tendency toward a perfect
bipartite structure (Fig. 5b), although we have not explicitly
modeled how the network structure should change with NP.
The tendency toward a bipartite structure may reflect the
fact that the average degree of generated networks becomes
smaller as the size of network shrinks. Indeed, the relationship
between N and M across the fitted daily networks explains
the emergence of superlinearity (Fig. 5c), which indicates that
M ∝ N1.5 or 〈k〉 ∝ √N .
Discussion
The time series of daily networks reveal many dynamical reg-
ularities encoded in millions of financial transactions. An
important finding is that the transaction patterns between
banks are similar to the social communication patters of hu-
mans, which have been observed at higher temporal resolutions
(typically 20∼60 seconds) than a daily resolution. For instance,
a power-law scaling in the distribution of the interaction du-
ration has been found in human contact networks, such as
face-to-face conversation networks of individuals [32, 33]. The
sublinear growth pattern of aggregated degree has also been
reported in the mobility pattern of mobile-phone users [45].
In addition, superlinear scaling at the network level (called
“urban scaling" [38]) emerges in various social contexts, such as
the relationship between the number of mobile connections and
the population size of cities [34]. These similarities between
financial transaction patterns of banks and social communica-
tion patterns of humans strongly suggest that banks choose
trading partners in the same manner as individuals decide
whom to talk with. The discovered dynamical patterns are
quite robust and hold true even amid the global financial cri-
sis, suggesting that there is a universal mechanism connecting
financial and social dynamics.
The contribution of our work is not limited to the findings
on the transition patterns of interbank networks. The model we
propose here can be used as a generator of synthetic networks
for studies of financial systemic risk. As is often the case,
inaccessibility to empirical data on financial transactions forces
academic researchers to use synthetic networks with limited
empirical properties [11, 21] or to infer real network structure
based on available partial information [14, 50, 51]. Our model
provides a way to easily generate synthetic time series of
networks that exhibit dynamical properties characterizing the
daily evolution of real interbank networks. We hope that
the current work will not only deepen our knowledge about
the dynamic nature of interbank networks, but also help to
improve the conventional approach of systemic-risk studies
toward a more dynamic analysis.
We leave three remaining issues that need to be addressed in
future research. First, while the observed dynamical patterns
are quite robust and seem universal given the similarity to
social network dynamics, it is worth investigating whether
those findings hold true in other countries as well. Second, we
might be able to find other dynamical patterns at different
time resolutions such as intraday, weekly, and monthly. If
that is the case, we need to see if those dynamical patterns
found in different time scales are consistently explained by the
current model. Finally, our finding reveals an independence of
local interaction patterns of banks from a global-scale network
evolution, such as the decreasing trend in network size. This
implies that there is no feedback loop between micro and
macroscopic phenomena, meaning that banks are not adaptive
to their environments. Further research is needed to explain
why such a decoupling phenomenon takes hold in financial
networks.
Materials and Methods
Data
The original time-stamped data are commercially available
from e-MID SIM S.p.A based in Milan, Italy [31]. The data
contain all the unsecured euro-denominated transactions be-
tween financial institutions made via an online trading plat-
form, e-MID. We focus on overnight (labelled as “ON") and
overnight-large (“ONL") transactions. ON transactions refer
to contracts that require borrowers to repay the full amount
within one business day from the day the loans are executed.
ONL transactions are a variant of the ON transactions, where
the amount is no less than 100 million euros.
The data processing procedure is as follows. First, we
extract transactions made between September 4, 2000 and
December 31, 2015. The choice of the initial date is based on
the introduction of the ONL category [9]. This leaves us with
1,119,258 ON and 73,480 ONL transactions, which comprise
86% of all the transactions during that period. Next, we trans-
form all the ON and ONL transactions into a sequence of daily
networks by applying the daily time window of 8:00–18:00 [24].
We then extract the transactions that belong to the largest
weakly connected component of each daily network, which
account for 99.3% of all the daily transactions on average
(the minimum is 78%). We referred to this component as
daily network throughout the analysis. Multiple edges be-
tween two banks are simplified. In the end, we have 1,187,415
transactions conducted by 308 financial institutions over 3,922
business days.
Model
The dynamic network formation proceeds by repeating the
following two steps: (i) edge creation between banks and (ii)
update of each bank’s activity level ai,t ∈ [0, 1], 1 ≤ i ≤ NP.
We consider three bank types: pure lenders, pure borrowers,
and bidirectional traders. Pure lenders (pure borrowers) are
the banks that may lend to (borrow from) but never borrow
from (lend to) other banks. To take into account the fact that
the interbank structure is almost perfectly bipartite when the
network size is small (Fig. 1c), we assume that bidirectional
traders may lend only to pure borrowers and borrow only
from pure lenders. The fraction of each bank type is given as
(fB, fL, fD) = (0.56, 0.34, 0.1) for pure borrowers, pure lenders,
and bidirectional traders, respectively, based on the empirical
average (Table S1). The type assigned to each bank is fixed
throughout the simulation.
At the beginning of the edge-creation stage in day t, the
interbank system comprises NP isolated banks without any
edges. Bank i lends to bank j (and thus a directed edge from
i to j is formed) in day t with probability pij,t, given by
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pij,t ≡
{
(ai,taj,t)α , if i /∈ B, j /∈ L, and {i, j} 6⊂ D,
0 otherwise,
[3]
where L, B, and D denote the sets of pure lenders, pure bor-
rowers, and bidirectional traders, respectively. After applying
this procedure to every combination of (i, j), we remove all
the edges and move on to day t+ 1.
At the beginning of day t+ 1, the activity level of bank i
is updated as follows. With probability h(ai,t), ai,t+1 is reset
to a random value drawn from the uniform distribution on
[0, 1]. With probability 1−h(ai,t), the activity level is updated
according to a random walk process on the unit circle, given
by
ai,t+1 = | cos θi,t+1|, [4]
θi,t+1 = θi,t + 2piεi,t+1, [5]
where θi,t+1 is a random-walk variable that describes the angle
on the unit circle (see Fig. S15 for a schematic). Since an
activity level must be on [0, 1], ai,t+1 is given by the absolute
values of cos θi,t+1. εi,t+1 is a random variable uniformly
distributed on [−0.002, 0.002]. The initial value for the angle
is set such that θi,0 = arccos(ai,0), where ai,0 is drawn from
the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. The above two steps, edge
creation and activity updating, are repeated until we reach
the predefined terminal date T .
The introduction of stochastic variable ε is meant to cap-
ture fluctuations in individual banks’ daily liquidity demand,
which can lead to a turnover of participating banks (Fig. S4).
Without a variability of ε (i.e., if a is fixed), the metabolism
of the model interbank market would be unrealistically low.
The reset probability function is specified as h(ai) ≡ c−11 ac2i .
In total, the model has four parameters: NP, α, c1, and
c2. Parameter NP is a key parameter of the model and we
explain its role in the main text. The other parameters, α,
c1, and c2, affect the structure of networks through the edge-
creation probability Eq. (3). We find that the combination
(α, c1, c2) = (4, 2000, 2) gives the best fit to the observed
superlinearity (Fig. 2a) and the distributions of τ and ∆τ
(Figs. S7–S9 in SM). We verified the robustness of the results
against moderate changes in (α, c1, c2) (Figs. S7–S9).
We set T = 6500 and discard the initial 5,000 simulation
periods to eliminate the influence of the initial conditions.
This leaves 1,500 effective simulation periods, which roughly
correspond to 6 years of the empirical data.
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S1. Fitting procedure for the interval distribution
As shown in Fig. 2c, the empirical distribution of transaction
interval ∆τ for each bank pair does not follow a power law. We
instead find that the interval distribution nicely fits a Weibull
distribution for 1 ≤ ∆τ < ∆τu, where ∆τu denotes a cutoff
value.
The complementary cumulative distribution function
(CCDF) of a Weibull distribution [1] is given by
Pc(x) = exp
{
−
(
x
λ
)c}
for x > 0, [S1]
where c > 0 and λ > 0 are parameters. Distribution Pc(x) can
also be written as nx/NX , where NX is the total number of
interval values observed, and nx is the rank of interval length
x (i.e., nx is the number of observed interval values such that
∆τ ≥ x). By taking the logarithm of nx/NX = exp {− (x/λ)c},
we obtain the following expression [2]:
(xn)c = −β(lognx − logNX), [S2]
where xn represents the interval length whose rank is n (i.e.,
x1 > x2 > . . . > xNX ), and β is defined as β ≡ λc. We use
Eq. (S2) to find β and c that give the best fit to a Weibull dis-
tribution. We introduce nˆ, the logged rank of cutoff value ∆τu,
and estimate parameters (β, c) for a subset of the observed
values of ∆τ , in a similar way as is done in the standard estima-
tion procedure for a power-law exponent [3]. The cutoff ∆τu
corresponds to the enˆ-th largest interval length. Parameters
β, c, and nˆ are determined as follows.
1. For a given pair (c, nˆ), estimate β in Eq. (S2) by the
ordinary least squares (OLS). Repeat this for sufficiently
many values of c ∈ [0, 1) (we set c < 1 because the tail
of the empirical distribution of ∆τ is apparently heavier
than that of an exponential distribution). The estimate
of β is denoted by β∗(c, nˆ).
2. For nˆ given in step 1, find the optimal value of c, denoted
by c∗ (nˆ), such that the coefficient of determination R2
for the OLS regression is maximized, in which case β =
β∗(c∗(nˆ), nˆ). Let R2(nˆ) denote the maximum of R2 for a
given nˆ.
3. By repeating steps 1 and 2 for all the predefined values
of nˆ, find the optimal cutoff value nˆ∗ ≡ argmaxnˆR2(nˆ).
In the end, the estimates of the parameters are given by
nˆ = nˆ∗, c = c∗(nˆ∗), and β = β∗(c∗(nˆ∗), nˆ∗).
Figure S1a illustrates the determination of the optimal log-
rank cutoff nˆ∗. The inset of Fig. 2c in the main text shows the
OLS fit to Eq. (S2) when nˆ = nˆ∗ (note that xn corresponds to
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Fig. S1. Fitting of the interval distribution with a Weibull distribution. (a) Determination
of the optimal log-rank cutoff nˆ∗. (b) Empirical CCDF of interval ∆τ (symbols) and
the Weibull distribution with the estimated parameters (lines). The cutoffs ∆τu and
∆τ ′u are obtained from the optimal log-rank cutoffs nˆ
∗ and nˆ∗′, respectively.
∆τ in that figure). Once nˆ∗ is determined, it is straightforward
to obtain the corresponding cutoff ∆τu. Figure S1b verifies the
goodness of fit between the empirical CCDF and the estimated
Weibull distribution.
S2. Analytical solution for the fitness model with a fi-
nite size effect
Relationship between N and M
As we described in the main text, we assume that initially
there are NP many isolated nodes. Node i (1 ≤ i ≤ NP) is
assigned a fitness ai ∈ [0, 1] which is drawn from density ρ(a).
The probability of edge formation between two nodes i and
j is denoted by u(ai, aj). We define N as the number of nodes
connected with at least one edge and M as the total number
of edges in a network. We express N and M as functions of
NP: {
N = (1− q0(NP))NP,
M = k(NP)NP2 ,
[S3]
where q0(NP) is the probability of a randomly chosen node
being isolated (i.e., no edges attached) and k(NP) is the average
degree over all nodes including isolated ones. Thus, to obtain
the functional forms of N andM , we need to get the functional
forms of q0(NP) and k(NP). In the following, we first derive
the functional forms of q0(NP) and k(NP) in a general setting.
Then, we will restrict our attention to the case with ρ(a) = 1
(i.e., a uniform distribution) and u(ai, aj) = (aiaj)α to explain
1
the empirical superlinear relation between N and M in the
same specification as in the main text.
Average degree of networks including isolated nodes, k(NP)
Given the fitnesses of all nodes a = (a1, a2, . . . , aNP), the
probability that node i has degree ki is
g(ki|a) =
∑
ci
[∏
j 6=i
u(ai, aj)cij (1− u(ai, aj))1−cij
]
× δ
(∑
j 6=i
cij , ki
)
, [S4]
where cij ∈ {0, 1} is the (i, j)-element of the adjacency matrix
and ci = (c1i, c2i, . . . , cNPi)> is the ith column vector. Func-
tion δ(x, y) denotes the Kronecker delta. Let us redefine a
product term in the square bracket of Eq. (S4) as
fj(cij ; ai, aj) ≡ u(ai, aj)cij (1− u(ai, aj))1−cij . [S5]
Since g(ki|a) is the convolution of {fj(cij ; ai, aj)}j , its gener-
ating function
gˆi(z|a) ≡
∑
ki
zkig(ki|a) [S6]
is decomposed as
gˆi(z|a) =
∏
j 6=i
fˆj(z; ai, aj), [S7]
where fˆj is the generating function of fj(cij ; ai, aj), given by
fˆj(z; ai, aj) ≡
∑
aij
zaijfj(aij ; ai, aj). [S8]
Degree distribution p(ki;NP) is defined by the probability
that node i has degree ki and is related to g(ki|a) such that
p(ki;NP) =
∫
g(ki|a)ρ(a)da, [S9]
where we define ρ(a) ≡∏
i
ρ(ai) and da ≡
∏
i
dai. Therefore,
differentiation of gˆi(z|a) with respect to z gives the average
degree k(NP):
k(NP) =
∑
ki
kip(ki;NP)
=
∑
ki
ki
∫
g(ki|a)ρ(a)da
= d
dz
∫
gˆi(z|a)ρ(a)da
∣∣∣
z=1
= d
dz
∫
ρ(ai)dai
∏
j 6=i
∫
fˆj(z; ai, aj)ρ(aj)daj
∣∣∣
z=1
=
∫
ρ(ai)dai
d
dz
[∫
fˆ(z; ai, h)ρ(h)dh
]NP−1∣∣∣
z=1
= (NP − 1)
∫
ρ(ai)dai
[∫
daρ(a)fˆ(z; ai, a)
]NP−2
×
∫
daρ(a) d
dz
fˆ(z; ai, a)
∣∣∣
z=1
. [S10]
From Eqs. (S5) and (S8), we have fˆ(z; ai, a) =∑
cij
zcijf(cij ; ai, a) = (z − 1)u(ai, a) + 1. It follows that∫
daρ(a)fˆ(z; ai, a) = (z − 1)
∫
daρ(a)u(ai, a) + 1, [S11]∫
daρ(a) d
dz
fˆ(z; ai, a) =
∫
daρ(a)u(ai, a). [S12]
Substituting these into Eq. (S10) leads to
k(NP) = (NP − 1)
∫ ∫
dada′ρ(a)ρ(a′)u(a, a′). [S13]
It should be noted that Eq. (S13) is equivalent to Eq. (21) of
Ref. [4].
Probability of node isolation, q0(NP)
From Eq. (S9), the probability of a node being isolated,
q0(NP) ≡ p(ki = 0;NP), is given by
q0(NP) =
∫
g(ki = 0|a)ρ(a)da
=
∫
daiρ(ai)
[
1−
∫
u(ai, a)ρ(a)da
]NP−1
. [S14]
Special case: ρ(a) = 1 and u(a, a′) = (aa′)α
Substituting ρ(a) = 1 and u(a, a′) = (aa′)α into Eq. (S13)
gives
k(NP) =
( 1
α+ 1
)2
(NP − 1). [S15]
Similarly, substituting the same conditions into Eq. (S14) gives
q0(NP) =
∫
dai
(
1− 1
α+ 1a
α
i
)NP−1
. [S16]
By rewriting the integrand as x = 1− 1
α+1a
α
i , we have
q0(NP) =
1
α
(α+ 1)
1
α
∫ 1
1− 1
α+1
(1− x) 1α−1xNP−1dx
= 1
α
(α+ 1)
1
α
[
B
(
NP,
1
α
)
− B1− 1
α+1
(
NP,
1
α
)]
,
[S17]
where B(x, y) ≡ ∫ 10 tx−1(1− t)y−1dt is the beta function and
Bz(x, y) ≡
∫ z
0 t
x−1(1− t)y−1dt (0 < Re(z) ≤ 1) is the incom-
plete beta function. Combining these results with Eq. (S3),
we end up with{
N = NP
[
1− 1
α
(α+ 1) 1α
(
B
(
NP,
1
α
)
− B1− 1
α+1
(
NP,
1
α
))]
,
M =
( 1
α+1
)2 NP(NP−1)
2 .
[S18]
If NP is sufficiently large, then q0(NP) ' 0 and thereby N '
NP and M ' (1/α + 1)2N(N − 1)/2 ∝ N2. Therefore, the
solution is consistent with that of the previous studies [4–6]
in the absence of the finite-size effect.
2
S3. Dynamics of weights
Empirical observation
On top of the edge dynamics that we discussed in the main
text, the dynamics of edge weights also exhibits specific pat-
terns. Let us define the weight of an edge, wij,t, as the total
amount of funds transferred from bank i to j on day t. We de-
fine the growth rate of edge weights as rij,t ≡ log (wij,t+1/wij,t)
for bank pair (i, j) such that wij,t+1wij,t > 0 [7]. The distri-
bution of rij,t, aggregated over all pairs and all t, exhibits a
symmetric triangular shape with a distinct peak at 0 (Fig. S2a).
The shape of the distribution indicates that a large fraction of
bank pairs do not change the amount of funds when they keep
trading, and if they change the amount, the rate of change
will be typically small. A similar sort of triangular-shaped
distribution of the growth rate of weights has also been found
in networks of email exchanges [8], airlines [7] and cattle trades
between stock farming facilities [9].
Model of weight dynamics
To reproduce the dynamics of edge weights, we add the
following step to the model. Let us consider the edge between
i and j formed in day t. If there is an edge from i to j in day
t− 1, then the edge weights in day t is given by
wij,t ≡
{
wij,t−1 with probability 1− q,
κνij,tpij,t with probability q,
[S19]
where random variable νij,t takes different values across bank
pairs and are assumed to follow a power-law distribution with
exponent η to maximize the fit to P (r) (Fig. S2) and the
empirical weight distribution (Fig. S3 a–c). Positive constant
κ is introduced to match the scale of edge weights with that of
the data (i.e., millions of euros). On the other hand, if there
is no edge from i to j in day t− 1 but there is in day t, then
wij,t ≡ κνij,tpij,t. [S20]
Any non-adjacent pairs (i, j) has wij,t = 0.
We set the weight parameters as (q, κ, η) = (0.5, 80, 3.3)
to fit P (r) and the simulated weight distributions with the
empirical ones, respectively. Figures S2b and S3d–f show
that our model of weight dynamics successfully replicates the
empirical distributions.
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Fig. S2. Distribution of the growth rates of edge weights r (aggregated over all bank pairs) for (a) the data and (b) the model.
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Fig. S5. CCDF of duration τ and interval ∆τ for transactions of each bank pair, aggregated over all pairs. The exponents are estimated by using the Matlab codes downloaded
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period. To visualize the stability of simulated CCDF, 20 lines of CCDF generated by independent 20 runs are plotted for NP = 300.
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Fig. S8. Effect of altering the specification of reset probability h(a) on the duration distribution of pairwise transactions. Parameters c1 and c2 are defined by h(a) = c−11 a
c2 .
Blue circle denotes the empirical CCDF for the 2000–2006 period. 20 lines of CCDF generated by independent 20 runs are plotted for NP = 300.
100 101 102 103
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
c1 =1000, c2 =1
100 101 102 103
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
c1 =2000, c2 =1
100 101 102 103
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
c1 =4000, c2 =1
100 101 102 103
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
c1 =1000, c2 =2
100 101 102 103
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
c1 =2000, c2 =2
100 101 102 103
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
c1 =4000, c2 =2
100 101 102 103
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
c1 =1000, c2 =3
100 101 102 103
∆τ
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
C
C
D
F
c1 =2000, c2 =3
100 101 102 103
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
c1 =4000, c2 =3
a
ihg
fed
cb
Fig. S9. Effect of altering the specification of reset probability h(a) on the interval distribution for bank pairs. See Fig. S8 for details.
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Fig. S10. CCDF of in- and out-degree distribution. (a)–(b) The data. (c)–(d) The model.
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Fig. S11. Scatter plots of strength against degree in the empirical data. Light-gray square denotes the average strength for a given degree. 80% of the markers are randomly
removed since most of them are overlapped. See Fig. S3 for the definition of the strength.
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Fig. S12. Scatter plots of strength against degree in the model. Light-gray square denotes the average strength for a given degree. 80% of the markers are randomly removed
as in Fig. S11. See Fig. S3 for the definition of the strength.
logM =  1.27 + 1.49 logN
Fig. S13. Scatter plot of (N,M) of networks generated with variousNP values (color bar). Model networks are generated 500 times for a givenNP. Solid line is the empirical
regression line identical to that shown in Fig. 2a. Inset : Joint conditional probability function f(N,M |NP) (color bar) with NP = 200.
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Fig. S14. Effect of altering the specification of reset probability h(a) on scaling relation between N and M . Parameters c1 and c2 are defined by h(a) = c−11 a
c2 . Model
networks are generated 500 times for a given NP.
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Fig. S15. Schematic of the activity update in the dynamical fitness model. (a) Circular random walk of angle θi on the unit circle. Activity level of bank i is given by
ai = | cos θi|. (b) Activity level ai evolves according to Eqs. (4) and (5) with reset probability h(ai).
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Table S1. Fraction of each bank type in the data
All 2000–2006 2007–2009 2010–2015
Pure lender 0.556 0.553 0.571 0.558
Pure borrower 0.335 0.300 0.318 0.380
Others 0.110 0.147 0.111 0.062
“Pure lender" (“pure borrower") denotes the banks that lend to (borrow from)
but never borrow from (lend to) other banks.
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